Deadly bird flu studies to stay secret for now: WHO

GENEVA/LONDON (Reuters) - Two studies showing how scientists mutated the H5N1 bird flu virus into a form that could cause a deadly human pandemic will be published only after experts fully assess the risks, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Friday.

Speaking after a high-level meeting of flu experts and U.S. security officials in Geneva, a WHO official said an deal had been reached in principle to keep details of the controversial work secret until deeper risk analyses could be carried out.

"There is a preference from a public health perspective for full disclosure of the information in these two studies. However there are significant public concerns surrounding this research that should first be addressed," said Keiji Fukuda, the WHO's assistant director-general for health security and environment.

The WHO called the meeting to break a deadlock between scientists who have studied the mutations needed to make H5N1 bird flu transmit between mammals, and the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which wanted the work censored before it was published in scientific journals.

Biosecurity experts fear mutated forms of the virus that research teams in The Netherlands and the United States independently created could escape or fall into the wrong hands and be used to spark a pandemic worse than the 1918-19 outbreak of Spanish flu that killed up to 40 million people.

WHO spokesman Gregory Hartl said that because of these fears, "there must be a much fuller discussion of risk and benefits of research in this area and risks of virus itself."

But a scientist close to the NSABB who spoke to Reuters immediately after the decision said the board was deeply "frustrated" by the situation.

The only NSABB member attending the meeting was infectious disease expert Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University and he "got the hell beat out of him," the source said.

"It was a closed meeting dominated by flu people who have a vested interest in continuing this kind of work," he added.

The WHO said experts at the meeting included lead researchers of the two studies, scientific journals interested in publishing the research, funders of the research, countries who provided the viruses, bioethicists and directors from several WHO-linked laboratories specializing in influenza.

HIGH FATALITY RATE

The H5N1 virus, first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, is entrenched among poultry in many countries, mainly in Asia, but so far remains in a form that is hard for humans to catch.

It is known to have infected nearly 600 people worldwide since 2003, killing half of them, a far higher death rate than the H1N1 swine flu which caused a flu pandemic in 2009/2010.

Last year, two teams of scientists - one led by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center and another led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin - said they had found that just a handful of mutations would allow H5N1 to spread like ordinary flu between mammals, and remain as deadly as it is now.

This type of research is seen as vital for scientists working to develop vaccines, diagnostic tests and anti-viral drugs that could be deployed in the event of an H5N1 pandemic.

In December, the NSABB asked two leading scientific journals, Nature and Science, to withhold details of the research for fear it could be used by bioterrorists.

They said a potentially deadlier form of bird flu poses one of the gravest known threats to the human population and justified the unprecedented call to censor the research.

The WHO voiced concerns, and flu researchers from around the world declared a 60-day moratorium on January 20 on "any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses" that produce easily contagious forms.

Dr. Bruce Alberts, editor-in-chief of the journal Science, said it is now likely the paper submitted to Science and to the journal Nature will be published in full.

Alberts said it is still not clear how the scientists in Geneva plan to handle biosafety issues mentioned by the group, and it is still not clear when the papers will be published, but it will likely not be years.

"I hope this does not cause the world governments and WHO to stop working on this problem," Alberts said of any potential fallout from the decision at a news briefing at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Vancouver.

When asked how the journal is safeguarding copies of the as-yet-unpublished paper, he said it is in a locked electronic file and is password protected. And the magazine has asked reviewers of the paper to destroy their review copies.

Fouchier, who took part in the two-day meeting at the WHO which ended on Friday, said the consensus of experts and officials there was "that in the interest of public health, the full paper should be published" at some future date.

"This was based on the high public health impact of this work and the need to share the details of the studies with a very big community in the interest of science, surveillance and public health on the whole," he told reporters.

In its current form, people can contract H5N1 only through close contact with ducks, chickens or other birds that carry it, and not from infected individuals.

But H5N1 can acquire mutations that allow it to live in the upper respiratory tract rather than the lower, and the Dutch and U.S. researchers found a way to make it travel via airborne droplets between infected ferrets. Flu viruses are thought to behave similarly in the animals and in people.

Asked about the potential bioterrorism risks of his and the U.S. team's work, Fouchier said "it was the view of the entire group" at the meeting that the risks that this particular virus or flu viruses in general could be used as bioterrorism agents "would be very, very slim".

"The risks are not nil, but they are very, very small."

(Additional reporting by Sharon Begley in New York and Julie Steenhuysen in Chicago; editing by Andrew Roche and Todd Eastham)

View the original article here

Deadly bird flu studies to stay secret for now: WHO

GENEVA/LONDON (Reuters) - Two studies showing how scientists mutated the H5N1 bird flu virus into a form that could cause a deadly human pandemic will be published only after experts fully assess the risks, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Friday.

Speaking after a high-level meeting of flu experts and U.S. security officials in Geneva, a WHO official said an deal had been reached in principle to keep details of the controversial work secret until deeper risk analyses could be carried out.

"There is a preference from a public health perspective for full disclosure of the information in these two studies. However there are significant public concerns surrounding this research that should first be addressed," said Keiji Fukuda, the WHO's assistant director-general for health security and environment.

The WHO called the meeting to break a deadlock between scientists who have studied the mutations needed to make H5N1 bird flu transmit between mammals, and the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which wanted the work censored before it was published in scientific journals.

Biosecurity experts fear mutated forms of the virus that research teams in The Netherlands and the United States independently created could escape or fall into the wrong hands and be used to spark a pandemic worse than the 1918-19 outbreak of Spanish flu that killed up to 40 million people.

WHO spokesman Gregory Hartl said that because of these fears, "there must be a much fuller discussion of risk and benefits of research in this area and risks of virus itself."

But a scientist close to the NSABB who spoke to Reuters immediately after the decision said the board was deeply "frustrated" by the situation.

The only NSABB member attending the meeting was infectious disease expert Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University and he "got the hell beat out of him," the source said.

"It was a closed meeting dominated by flu people who have a vested interest in continuing this kind of work," he added.

The WHO said experts at the meeting included lead researchers of the two studies, scientific journals interested in publishing the research, funders of the research, countries who provided the viruses, bioethicists and directors from several WHO-linked laboratories specializing in influenza.

HIGH FATALITY RATE

The H5N1 virus, first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, is entrenched among poultry in many countries, mainly in Asia, but so far remains in a form that is hard for humans to catch.

It is known to have infected nearly 600 people worldwide since 2003, killing half of them, a far higher death rate than the H1N1 swine flu which caused a flu pandemic in 2009/2010.

Last year, two teams of scientists - one led by Ron Fouchier at Erasmus Medical Center and another led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin - said they had found that just a handful of mutations would allow H5N1 to spread like ordinary flu between mammals, and remain as deadly as it is now.

This type of research is seen as vital for scientists working to develop vaccines, diagnostic tests and anti-viral drugs that could be deployed in the event of an H5N1 pandemic.

In December, the NSABB asked two leading scientific journals, Nature and Science, to withhold details of the research for fear it could be used by bioterrorists.

They said a potentially deadlier form of bird flu poses one of the gravest known threats to the human population and justified the unprecedented call to censor the research.

The WHO voiced concerns, and flu researchers from around the world declared a 60-day moratorium on January 20 on "any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses" that produce easily contagious forms.

Dr. Bruce Alberts, editor-in-chief of the journal Science, said it is now likely the paper submitted to Science and to the journal Nature will be published in full.

Alberts said it is still not clear how the scientists in Geneva plan to handle biosafety issues mentioned by the group, and it is still not clear when the papers will be published, but it will likely not be years.

"I hope this does not cause the world governments and WHO to stop working on this problem," Alberts said of any potential fallout from the decision at a news briefing at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Vancouver.

When asked how the journal is safeguarding copies of the as-yet-unpublished paper, he said it is in a locked electronic file and is password protected. And the magazine has asked reviewers of the paper to destroy their review copies.

Fouchier, who took part in the two-day meeting at the WHO which ended on Friday, said the consensus of experts and officials there was "that in the interest of public health, the full paper should be published" at some future date.

"This was based on the high public health impact of this work and the need to share the details of the studies with a very big community in the interest of science, surveillance and public health on the whole," he told reporters.

In its current form, people can contract H5N1 only through close contact with ducks, chickens or other birds that carry it, and not from infected individuals.

But H5N1 can acquire mutations that allow it to live in the upper respiratory tract rather than the lower, and the Dutch and U.S. researchers found a way to make it travel via airborne droplets between infected ferrets. Flu viruses are thought to behave similarly in the animals and in people.

Asked about the potential bioterrorism risks of his and the U.S. team's work, Fouchier said "it was the view of the entire group" at the meeting that the risks that this particular virus or flu viruses in general could be used as bioterrorism agents "would be very, very slim".

"The risks are not nil, but they are very, very small."

(Additional reporting by Sharon Begley in New York and Julie Steenhuysen in Chicago; editing by Andrew Roche and Todd Eastham)

View the original article here

Decision time for researchers of deadly bird flu

LONDON/GENEVA (Reuters) - When 22 bird flu experts meet at the World Health Organization this week, they will be tasked with deciding just how far scientists should go in creating lethal mutant viruses in the name of research.

The hurriedly assembled meeting is designed to try to settle an unprecedented row over a call to ban publication of two scientific studies which detail how to mutate H5N1 bird flu viruses into a form that could cause a deadly human pandemic.

But experts say whatever the outcome, no amount of censorship, global regulation or shutting down of research projects could stop rogue scientists getting the tools to create and release a pandemic H5N1 virus if they were intent on evil.

"It doesn't matter how much you restrict scientists from doing good, bad people can still do bad things," said Wendy Barclay, an expert in flu virology at Imperial College London.

The WHO called the meeting, for February 16 and 17 in Geneva, to work out how to break a deadlock between scientists who have studied the mutations needed to make H5N1 transmit between mammals and U.S. biosecurity chiefs who want their work censored or "redacted" before it goes into scientific journals.

Since the two research teams, one in the Netherlands and one in the United States, have found that just a small number of mutations would allow H5N1 to spread like ordinary flu between mammals - and remain just as deadly as it is now - the meeting is likely to be tense and highly secretive. WHO officials repeatedly stress it will be a "closed door" event.

DEEP CONCERN

The United Nations health body has said it is "deeply concerned about the potential negative consequences" of work by the two leading flu research teams who in December said they had found ways to make H5N1 into a easily transmissible form capable of causing lethal human pandemics.

Flu researchers from around the world - more than 30 teams in all - declared a 60-day moratorium starting on January 20 on "any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses" that produce easily contagious forms of the virus.

The WHO has invited 22 people to this week's meeting, including the researchers who carried out the work, editors of the two journals, Science and Nature, who were asked to hold publication, and representatives from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) which asked for the papers to be censored.

Keiji Fukuda, the WHO's assistant director-general for health security and environment, who will chair the meeting, says he would like to secure agreement on whether the studies should be published, in full or part, and who should have access to them.

The scientific know-how is seen as vital for scientists to be able to develop vaccines, diagnostic tests and anti-viral drugs that could be deployed in the event of an H5N1 pandemic.

"It is important that research on these viruses should continue," Fukuda told Reuters. "They do pose a risk. There's a lot of things we don't know about them. The question is not really should we continue to do research ... but under what conditions can we do it so we don't unnecessarily create fears and risks."

Michael Osterholm, policy director at the Minnesota Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance and an NSABB member, has limited hope for what one meeting can achieve.

"Nothing will be solved in one meeting," he said. "This is a complicated issue that requires a great deal of international input. It is not a simple yes or no ... We have no margin for error here."

The H5N1 virus, first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, remains entrenched among poultry in many countries, mainly in Asia, but so far remains hard for humans to catch. It is known to have infected nearly 700 people worldwide since 2003, killing half of them, a far higher fatality rate than the new H1N1 flu virus, which originated in swine and caused a human influenza pandemic in 2009/2010.

Ron Fouchier, the scientist leading the Dutch team that gave H5N1 various genetic mutations and made it transmissible in mammals, argues the research must be published to help public health officials better prepare for a scenario where the virus could mutate and become more deadly, spreading from person to person via coughs and sneezes.

He has also said other research teams around the world are close to the same findings, some of them inadvertently, and should be warned in advance how the virus could become airborne.

In the short term, most scientists agree the moratorium is "a good gesture," as flu expert and former WHO health security adviser David Heymann describes it, one that offers the research community space to think.

SUPER STRAINS

But can it, or should it, go on forever?

Heymann, Barclay and many other scientists argue that stopping this type of research into flu viruses and other potentially lethal pathogens would set a dangerous precedent.

Although adding and deleting genes can create super-strains that put the entire world at risk, Heymann said, such work is also vital to developing tools such as effective vaccines and diagnostic tests which are needed quickly if a pandemic hits.

Preventing this research would also prevent legitimate and well-intentioned researchers from using all possible scientific options to prepare for naturally occurring, or deliberately caused, outbreaks.

John Edmunds, who heads the department of infectious disease epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, describes studies on genetic mutations of H5N1 as "very, very important work" that should not be stopped.

"This flu strain has the potential to cause such enormous damage, and it's important to know how far away we are from a horrible event like that," he said. "It appears we're not that far off it. That doesn't mean it's inevitably going to happen, but it makes it more important that we're vigilant."

Heymann, who now leads the Centre on Global Health Security at the Chatham House think-tank in London, says the best possible outcome would be a globally agreed "best practices framework on how you conduct this research and how you provide the information to others."

"It's also crucial to get understanding that even if you don't provide this research information, there are ways that rogue scientists can get it if they want to," he said.

View the original article here

Decision time for researchers of deadly bird

LONDON/GENEVA (Reuters) - When 22 bird flu experts meet at the World Health Organization this week, they will be tasked with deciding just how far scientists should go in creating lethal mutant viruses in the name of research.

The hurriedly assembled meeting is designed to try to settle an unprecedented row over a call to ban publication of two scientific studies which detail how to mutate H5N1 bird flu viruses into a form that could cause a deadly human pandemic.

But experts say whatever the outcome, no amount of censorship, global regulation or shutting down of research projects could stop rogue scientists getting the tools to create and release a pandemic H5N1 virus if they were intent on evil.

"It doesn't matter how much you restrict scientists from doing good, bad people can still do bad things," said Wendy Barclay, an expert in flu virology at Imperial College London.

The WHO called the meeting, for February 16 and 17 in Geneva, to work out how to break a deadlock between scientists who have studied the mutations needed to make H5N1 transmit between mammals and U.S. biosecurity chiefs who want their work censored or "redacted" before it goes into scientific journals.

Since the two research teams, one in the Netherlands and one in the United States, have found that just a small number of mutations would allow H5N1 to spread like ordinary flu between mammals - and remain just as deadly as it is now - the meeting is likely to be tense and highly secretive. WHO officials repeatedly stress it will be a "closed door" event.

DEEP CONCERN

The United Nations health body has said it is "deeply concerned about the potential negative consequences" of work by the two leading flu research teams who in December said they had found ways to make H5N1 into a easily transmissible form capable of causing lethal human pandemics.

Flu researchers from around the world - more than 30 teams in all - declared a 60-day moratorium starting on January 20 on "any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses" that produce easily contagious forms of the virus.

The WHO has invited 22 people to this week's meeting, including the researchers who carried out the work, editors of the two journals, Science and Nature, who were asked to hold publication, and representatives from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) which asked for the papers to be censored.

Keiji Fukuda, the WHO's assistant director-general for health security and environment, who will chair the meeting, says he would like to secure agreement on whether the studies should be published, in full or part, and who should have access to them.

The scientific know-how is seen as vital for scientists to be able to develop vaccines, diagnostic tests and anti-viral drugs that could be deployed in the event of an H5N1 pandemic.

"It is important that research on these viruses should continue," Fukuda told Reuters. "They do pose a risk. There's a lot of things we don't know about them. The question is not really should we continue to do research ... but under what conditions can we do it so we don't unnecessarily create fears and risks."

Michael Osterholm, policy director at the Minnesota Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance and an NSABB member, has limited hope for what one meeting can achieve.

"Nothing will be solved in one meeting," he said. "This is a complicated issue that requires a great deal of international input. It is not a simple yes or no ... We have no margin for error here."

The H5N1 virus, first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, remains entrenched among poultry in many countries, mainly in Asia, but so far remains hard for humans to catch. It is known to have infected nearly 700 people worldwide since 2003, killing half of them, a far higher fatality rate than the new H1N1 flu virus, which originated in swine and caused a human influenza pandemic in 2009/2010.

Ron Fouchier, the scientist leading the Dutch team that gave H5N1 various genetic mutations and made it transmissible in mammals, argues the research must be published to help public health officials better prepare for a scenario where the virus could mutate and become more deadly, spreading from person to person via coughs and sneezes.

He has also said other research teams around the world are close to the same findings, some of them inadvertently, and should be warned in advance how the virus could become airborne.

In the short term, most scientists agree the moratorium is "a good gesture," as flu expert and former WHO health security adviser David Heymann describes it, one that offers the research community space to think.

SUPER STRAINS

But can it, or should it, go on forever?

Heymann, Barclay and many other scientists argue that stopping this type of research into flu viruses and other potentially lethal pathogens would set a dangerous precedent.

Although adding and deleting genes can create super-strains that put the entire world at risk, Heymann said, such work is also vital to developing tools such as effective vaccines and diagnostic tests which are needed quickly if a pandemic hits.

Preventing this research would also prevent legitimate and well-intentioned researchers from using all possible scientific options to prepare for naturally occurring, or deliberately caused, outbreaks.

John Edmunds, who heads the department of infectious disease epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, describes studies on genetic mutations of H5N1 as "very, very important work" that should not be stopped.

"This flu strain has the potential to cause such enormous damage, and it's important to know how far away we are from a horrible event like that," he said. "It appears we're not that far off it. That doesn't mean it's inevitably going to happen, but it makes it more important that we're vigilant."

Heymann, who now leads the Centre on Global Health Security at the Chatham House think-tank in London, says the best possible outcome would be a globally agreed "best practices framework on how you conduct this research and how you provide the information to others."

"It's also crucial to get understanding that even if you don't provide this research information, there are ways that rogue scientists can get it if they want to," he said.

View the original article here

Decision time for researchers of deadly bird

LONDON/GENEVA (Reuters) - When 22 bird flu experts meet at the World Health Organization this week, they will be tasked with deciding just how far scientists should go in creating lethal mutant viruses in the name of research.

The hurriedly assembled meeting is designed to try to settle an unprecedented row over a call to ban publication of two scientific studies which detail how to mutate H5N1 bird flu viruses into a form that could cause a deadly human pandemic.

But experts say whatever the outcome, no amount of censorship, global regulation or shutting down of research projects could stop rogue scientists getting the tools to create and release a pandemic H5N1 virus if they were intent on evil.

"It doesn't matter how much you restrict scientists from doing good, bad people can still do bad things," said Wendy Barclay, an expert in flu virology at Imperial College London.

The WHO called the meeting, for February 16 and 17 in Geneva, to work out how to break a deadlock between scientists who have studied the mutations needed to make H5N1 transmit between mammals and U.S. biosecurity chiefs who want their work censored or "redacted" before it goes into scientific journals.

Since the two research teams, one in the Netherlands and one in the United States, have found that just a small number of mutations would allow H5N1 to spread like ordinary flu between mammals - and remain just as deadly as it is now - the meeting is likely to be tense and highly secretive. WHO officials repeatedly stress it will be a "closed door" event.

DEEP CONCERN

The United Nations health body has said it is "deeply concerned about the potential negative consequences" of work by the two leading flu research teams who in December said they had found ways to make H5N1 into a easily transmissible form capable of causing lethal human pandemics.

Flu researchers from around the world - more than 30 teams in all - declared a 60-day moratorium starting on January 20 on "any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses" that produce easily contagious forms of the virus.

The WHO has invited 22 people to this week's meeting, including the researchers who carried out the work, editors of the two journals, Science and Nature, who were asked to hold publication, and representatives from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) which asked for the papers to be censored.

Keiji Fukuda, the WHO's assistant director-general for health security and environment, who will chair the meeting, says he would like to secure agreement on whether the studies should be published, in full or part, and who should have access to them.

The scientific know-how is seen as vital for scientists to be able to develop vaccines, diagnostic tests and anti-viral drugs that could be deployed in the event of an H5N1 pandemic.

"It is important that research on these viruses should continue," Fukuda told Reuters. "They do pose a risk. There's a lot of things we don't know about them. The question is not really should we continue to do research ... but under what conditions can we do it so we don't unnecessarily create fears and risks."

Michael Osterholm, policy director at the Minnesota Center of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance and an NSABB member, has limited hope for what one meeting can achieve.

"Nothing will be solved in one meeting," he said. "This is a complicated issue that requires a great deal of international input. It is not a simple yes or no ... We have no margin for error here."

The H5N1 virus, first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, remains entrenched among poultry in many countries, mainly in Asia, but so far remains hard for humans to catch. It is known to have infected nearly 700 people worldwide since 2003, killing half of them, a far higher fatality rate than the new H1N1 flu virus, which originated in swine and caused a human influenza pandemic in 2009/2010.

Ron Fouchier, the scientist leading the Dutch team that gave H5N1 various genetic mutations and made it transmissible in mammals, argues the research must be published to help public health officials better prepare for a scenario where the virus could mutate and become more deadly, spreading from person to person via coughs and sneezes.

He has also said other research teams around the world are close to the same findings, some of them inadvertently, and should be warned in advance how the virus could become airborne.

In the short term, most scientists agree the moratorium is "a good gesture," as flu expert and former WHO health security adviser David Heymann describes it, one that offers the research community space to think.

SUPER STRAINS

But can it, or should it, go on forever?

Heymann, Barclay and many other scientists argue that stopping this type of research into flu viruses and other potentially lethal pathogens would set a dangerous precedent.

Although adding and deleting genes can create super-strains that put the entire world at risk, Heymann said, such work is also vital to developing tools such as effective vaccines and diagnostic tests which are needed quickly if a pandemic hits.

Preventing this research would also prevent legitimate and well-intentioned researchers from using all possible scientific options to prepare for naturally occurring, or deliberately caused, outbreaks.

John Edmunds, who heads the department of infectious disease epidemiology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, describes studies on genetic mutations of H5N1 as "very, very important work" that should not be stopped.

"This flu strain has the potential to cause such enormous damage, and it's important to know how far away we are from a horrible event like that," he said. "It appears we're not that far off it. That doesn't mean it's inevitably going to happen, but it makes it more important that we're vigilant."

Heymann, who now leads the Centre on Global Health Security at the Chatham House think-tank in London, says the best possible outcome would be a globally agreed "best practices framework on how you conduct this research and how you provide the information to others."

"It's also crucial to get understanding that even if you don't provide this research information, there are ways that rogue scientists can get it if they want to," he said.

View the original article here